On 21 November 2013, Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovych, suspended negotiations on the association agreement with the European Union (EU). Instead of pursuing the country's long-held course towards European integration, Mr Yanukovych decided to seek closer economic relations with the Russia-led Eurasian Customs Union (CU; see Diuk, 2014) . The CU has been widely regarded as a possible supranational alliance in the space formerly occupied by the Soviet Union (Dragneva-Lewers & Wolczuk, 2015) . The government's pro-Russia policies emerged even though polls suggested a majority of Ukrainian citizens supported the country's integration with the EU (Pifer & Thoburn, 2013) . This political shift provoked the social mobilization of citizens who shared commitment to Western-style democracy and supported the country's integration with the EU (Pifer & Thoburn, 2013) . The initially peaceful demonstrations, known as the Euromaidan 1 protests, spiralled into violent interactions with numerous deaths, following the government's decision to ban protests as well as intervene with heavily armed police (Kudelia, 2015) . This insurrection led to the fall of the Yanukovych government in February 2014.
Although the Euromaidan movement was the start of an open public revolt against the Ukrainian national government and its foreign policy, it was also an ideological struggle within the society over a geopolitical course (pro-Europe vs. pro-Russia) of the country (a nation that had, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, eschewed ethnic versions of nationalism, see Prizel, 1998) . This kind of schism or ideological dissensus within a larger collective over what it essentially stands for has been previously regarded as a boundary condition for novel group formation. Profound disagreements tend to transform one single category into two or more opposed groups that exclusively define their own position as the only one that reflects the true nature of the broader collective identity (e.g., Sani & Reicher, 1998; Sani & Todman, 2002) .
This paper seeks to explore the social psychological mechanisms behind the formation of the Euromaidan social movement in 2013/2014. The portrayal of schismatic processes within the Ukrainian society suggests that the emergent Euromaidan movement can be thought of as based around the classic social identity strategy of social competition, a rivalry among groups aimed at achieving a status within the nation as a larger superordinate entity (broadly defined, Turner, 1975) . Hence, we ask the following: Can the Euromaidan protests be understood as an attempt by certain social groups within the society to realign the boundaries of the Ukrainian national identity?
We seek to respond to this question by drawing on theoretical resources that come from the social identity tradition (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) . Specifically, we explore the ideas of bottom-up social movement formation (Smith, Thomas, & McGarty, 2015) , contested versions of national identity (Hopkins et al., 2006; Livingstone & Haslam, 2008; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001) , group disidentification (Becker & Tausch, 2013) , and the strategy of social competition (Turner, 1975) . We then integrate these ideas by drawing on recent work on the social identity approach to collective action (specifically the social identity model of collective action -SIMCA -of van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008 ; and the encapsulation model of the social identity of collective action -EMSICA - Thomas, Mavor, & McGarty, 2012; Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2016) to tease out the possible links between the emergent identity and collective action.
As a starting point for our analysis, we consider the notion of Smith et al. (2015) that social movements can form from the ground up when people come to agree that a current state of affairs is unacceptable and come to define themselves as being committed to acting to overturn that state of affairs. These authors suggest that the emergence of new shared social identities requires the articulation of, and consensus about, the desired change between like-minded individuals. In the case of Euromaidan, we suggest that there are three core elements that were agreed upon to become the basis of the emergent shared social identity. The first is that Euromaidan was grounded in Ukrainian national identity. As with the reform movements of the Arab Spring in nations such as Tunisia and Egypt (e.g., see McGarty, Thomas, Lala, Smith, & Bliuc, 2014) , Euromaidan was positioned as loyal to the nation and not as a breakaway or specific ethnic movement. Secondly, Euromaidan expressed an alignment with the EU. Euromaidan supporters were protesting against a change in direction that took Ukraine off its path to closer ties to the EU, and in a positive sense wished to restore that direction. In other words, Euromaidan was a pro-EU opinionbased group (see Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds, & Muntele, 2007; McGarty, Bliuc, Thomas, & Bongiorno, 2009 ). Thirdly, Euromaidan was strongly opposed to closer ties with the Russia-led CU. Thus, we believe that the blend of these three elements in Ukraine in 2014 allowed politicized collective identities (Simon & Klandermans, 2001 ) that conventionally require an extended history of adversity to emerge very rapidly.
From a social identity perspective, we argue that self-categorical processes leading to the emergence of new protest identities may be antagonistic in essence fostering individuals not merely to articulate what (i.e., opinion) they collectively stand for but also what they stand against (Chayinska, Minescu, & McGarty, 2017a; van Zomeren, Kutlaca, & Turner-Zwinkels, 2018) . In other words, we propose that the emergence of new protest identities involves a combination of both social identification and disidentification. By integrating the previous understanding of the role of these mechanisms in identity-driven collective action, we propose that their combined effects can be better understood in terms of 'push-and-pull' mechanisms of self-categorization whereby the identification path allows dissenting individuals to reassert (i.e., 'pull for') a self-definition in group terms and disidentification path allows them to reject (i.e., 'push against') alternative social categories being imposed to the self. To illustrate this point in the context of the Euromaidan movement, we argue that this opinion-based group identity may have encompassed individuals' willingness to reassert the preferred vision of national identity against the background of the government's negotiations with the Russia-led CU (i.e., pulling effects). Likewise, dissenting individuals might have sought to reject the alternative vision of Ukraine as a part of the CU, imposed by the authorities (i.e., pushing effects). More precisely, we seek to show that the emergence of Euromaidan opinionbased identity involved individuals' social identification in terms of purposeful selfinvestment into the larger superordinate entity (i.e., Ukrainian national category) as well as disidentification from the supranational integration project for Ukraine (i.e., CU as opposed to EU).
Our second core argument, which builds upon social identity theory, is that Euromaidan identity served a psychological basis for dissenting individuals to adopt a particular social change strategy towards the outgroup -a social competition strategyaimed at banding together to achieve a superior distinctiveness within the larger superordinate entity (e.g., Douglas, McGarty, Bliuc, & Lala, 2005; Haslam, 2001; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) . In particular, we suggest that participation in the Euromaidan protests was not merely an act of aspirational struggle towards Ukraine's political future within the EU, but also an act of revolt against the government and its intention to return to the Russian sphere of influence. The quote from Hopkins et al. (2006) at the start of this paper anticipates our reasoning nicely: By reconstruing identity in the face of oppression, pro-EU supporters were able to engage in coordinated collective action with the scope and hope to transform the old social structure. This is, of course, the true test of social movements. They can only actually move anything if their members are willing to act jointly to challenge the status quo. The explosion of recent research on the social identity approach to collective action offers many models for understanding the predictors of social mobilization, yet one of the core challenges of many existing approaches is in their ability to adequately explain the emergence of protest (Livingstone, 2014) .
Drawing on SIMCA and EMSICA (Thomas et al., 2012) , our analysis seeks to determine which set of causal relations better describes the emergence of the Euromaidan social movement. More precisely, we aimed to explore whether perceptions of injustice and group efficacy were likely to provide the basis for the emergent opinion-based identity of Euromaidan (as per EMSICA) or, vice versa, identification with the cause was likely to spark shared appraisals of injustice and agency (as per SIMCA).
By integrating the insights from the social identity research on collective action into a coherent framework, we thus seek to explore the mechanisms leading to the emergence of Euromaidan social movement in the course of Ukraine's political upheaval in 2014.
Self-categorical processes behind the emergence of protest identities: From self-investment to disidentification processes According to Smith et al. (2015) , new shared social identities develop when individuals encounter a radical conflict between the current and desired state of affairs and come together to articulate their validated opinion about the preferable alternative to the existing status quo. Prior social psychological research has suggested that disagreements about the way a superordinate category (e.g., nation) is defined can foster dissenting individuals to redefine the boundaries of this social category in order to promote a consolidated vision of the in-group as legitimate and ultimately true (e.g., Hopkins et al., 2006; Livingstone & Haslam, 2008; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Wenzel, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2007) . Such an intergroup competition usually takes the form of coordinated collective action (Douglas et al., 2005; Haslam, 2001 ).
Recent research inspired by self-categorization theory (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994) has tended to emphasize that individuals must have a vested loyalty towards the groups to which they belong prior to attempting to engage in strategies that might promote their group's standing (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2008) . According to Leach et al. (2008) , such a profound sense of loyalty towards the in-group may be experienced by individuals as a self-investment in the in-group comprising feelings of solidarity, satisfaction, and subjective importance of group membership.
Here, we propose that the articulation of such loyalties to the shared (national) category may constitute a pull factor in the emergence of the protest identity, reinforcing a self-defining core of the emergent group within the larger superordinate entity. Lending some support to this proposal, McGarty et al. (2014) have recently shown that the Arab Spring protests, that similarly to the Euromaidan had rapidly emerged and mobilized people for the anti-government collective action, positioned themselves as national liberation movements, thus trying to build a strong patriotic sentiment into the core of protest identity.
Arguably, people who are highly identified with an internally contested shared group may negatively experience any intragroup deviations (e.g., Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Long & Spears, 1997) . A social psychological solution to these disturbing feelings is group disidentification, which implies an estrangement of the self from unwanted group membership (e.g., Becker & Tausch, 2013; Matschke & Sassenberg, 2010; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007) . Recently, Becker and Tausch (2013) have proposed that disidentification may be best understood as a process that ranges from feelings of alienation to an active separation from one's in-group (i.e., detachment), expressed in feelings of dissatisfaction with one's group membership (i.e., dissatisfaction), and dissimilarity to other group members (i.e., dissimilarity). Although disidentification has been previously studied as an individual mobility strategy (e.g., Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind, & Solheim, 2009) , its effects can also be extended to the formation of so-called reactive or oppositional identities in which individuals tend to actively separate their group from the defining aspects of the dominant group (e.g., see Ogbu, 1993; Portes & Zhou, 1993) . It thus appears reasonable to suggest that disidentification may constitute a push factor in the emergence of an opinion-based group identity allowing dissenting individuals to distance themselves from alternative definitions of the shared category that do not adhere with the in-group's shared understanding of who they are and, importantly, who they want to become.
Considering the apparent role of 'push-and-pull' factors in delineating a new protest group within an old social structure, we thus centre our analysis of the emergent Euromaidan identity by examining the effects of individuals' self-investment into the superordinate entity (i.e., Ukrainian national category) and disidentification from the competing supranational integration projects for Ukraine (i.e., CU as opposed to EU).
Do anger and efficacy beliefs transform discontent into a protest identity?
Recent models of collective action -including SIMCA and EMSICA (Thomas et al., 2012 (Thomas et al., , 2016 ) -agree that collective action flows from a combination of social identification, group efficacy, and perceived injustice; that is, supporters are more likely to act where they are committed to the cause, believe the cause can be successful, and feel aggrieved, even angry, about the circumstances in which they have been placed. The meta-analysis of van and much subsequent research (e.g., Ayanian & Tausch, 2016; Saab, Spears, Tausch, & Sasse, 2016; Tausch et al., 2011) affirms the importance of these variables.
Where SIMCA and the EMSICA models make different predictions is in relation to the causal ordering of these variables. Specifically, SIMCA suggests that social identification predicts action directly and indirectly as an outcome of efficacy and perceived injustice. EMSICA suggests that identification is the primary direct predictor of collective action (encapsulating the effects of efficacy and perceived injustice). It is important to note that EMSICA was not proposed as a persistent alternative to SIMCA (see Livingstone, 2014 ; argument that collective action needs different models for qualitatively different circumstances). Rather the suggestion by Thomas et al. (2015) was that emergence of protest is a process that is dynamically related to unfolding events and that EMSICA may be most relevant to understanding group formation. The available evidence suggests that both causal orders (and perhaps other orderings) have merit (Fattori, Pozzi, Marzana, & Mannarini, 2015; Thomas et al., 2012; Wlodarcyzk, Basabe, P aez, & Zumeta, 2017) .
We propose that EMSICA may be relevant to the circumstances of Euromaidan, because the change of the government's foreign policy came as a surprise, and thus could evoke strong affective reactions (i.e., group-based anger) among Western-oriented individuals. There is considerable agreement in the literature as to the notion that anger is associatively linked with appraisals of unfairness or illegitimacy (e.g., Smith & Ortiz, 2002; Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999) as well as perceived ability to deal successfully with the eliciting situation by attacking the adversarial agent (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 2001) . Thomas et al. (2012 Thomas et al. ( , 2016 have demonstrated how the simultaneous experience of outrage and group efficacy facilitated the formation of new shared identities, which, in turn, provided a psychological basis for coordinated collective action.
The occurrence of the Euromaidan social movement provided us with an opportunity to determine which pathway better describes the emergence of the protest identity in this context.
STUDY CONTEXT
The emergence of the Euromaidan protest is an important case study of rapid social change for several reasons. First, although an ideological conflict between the two main groups -supporters and opponents of Ukraine's membership in the EU -has not always been intense, it has been confined to electoral competition several times since the state proclaimed its independence from the USSR in 1991 (e.g., Barrington & Herron, 2004) . Thus, the pro-EU and pro-Russia divide has been an enduring feature of domestic politics and remained mired in the internally contested national identity (e.g., Riabchuk, 2012) . Secondly, the government's sudden decision to postpone EU integration in favour of the alliance with Russia-led CU had led the dissatisfied Ukrainians to adopt competitive strategies (e.g., protest) as they faced (an apparently impermeable) obstacle to their shared aspiration about Ukraine's future within Europe. This opens up the possibility to study the emergence of the Euromaidan movement as a dynamic interplay between antagonism towards the government's attempt to align with the CU, support for closer links to the EU, and a commitment to the Ukrainian national identity.
STUDY AIMS
The overarching goal of the present study is to connect the insights from the social identity research on collective action in order to explore the mechanisms behind the emergence of the Euromaidan social movement in the course of Ukraine's political upheaval in 2014. First, building on the core ideas of bottom-up social movement formation (Smith et al., 2015) and group relations within the context of internally contested superordinate categories (Hopkins et al., 2006; Hopkins & Reicher, 2001; Livingstone & Haslam, 2008) , we argue that the abrupt decision of Ukraine's government to seek close ties with the Russia-led CU, as opposed to the EU, evoked an attempt of the Western-oriented Ukrainians to realign the boundaries of the Ukrainian national identity, by rejecting the alternative pro-Russia integration project. This may have led to the emergence of the new social group, that is, Euromaidan, formed through one's group-level self-investment into the Ukrainian superordinate category (pull effects) and disidentification from Russia-led CU as opposed to the EU (push effects).
Secondly, we suggest that Euromaidan identity served a psychological basis for dissenting individuals to adopt a social competition strategy with the scope to influence the government's foreign policy decisions by promoting the in-group's stance within the larger superordinate entity. More precisely, we propose that people who disidentify from the CU (as opposed to the EU) and invest their loyalties into the national superordinate category not merely come to form the new shared group (i.e., Euromaidan) within the old structure, but do so to defeat and overturn the alternative pro-CU movement championed by the government through coordinated collective action. Thus, we expect that selfinvestment in the Ukrainian national category and disidentification from the CU (as opposed to EU) will predict collective action intentions both directly and indirectly through the appraisals of injustice (group-based anger and perceived fairness of the government authorities), group efficacy beliefs, and Euromaidan identity. In addition, given that Ukraine is a country in transition to democracy, the perception of authorities as fair or just was expected to be a key determinant of the protests.
Finally, drawing on the core ideas of SIMCA and EMSICA (Thomas et al., 2012) , we seek to explore the possible links between the identity and collective action. We suggest that Euromaidan may be conceived as an emergent opinion-based group (as per EMSICA) to the extent that the group membership is preceded by self-categorical processes (i.e., self-investment and disidentification) and action-relevant reactions to injustice (i.e., anger and group efficacy beliefs). More precisely, we expected to find that the reversal of government's foreign policy towards the CU evoked strong affective reactions (i.e., group-based anger) and simultaneous calls for collective efforts to challenge the government (seemingly reflecting efficacy beliefs). The perceptions of anger and efficacy, we argue, may, in turn, become built into (i.e., encapsulated) the meaning of the Euromaidan identity.
Overall, we expected to find that the proposed theoretical model, which accounts for direct and indirect paths of the self-categorical push-and-pull processes in the emergence of the Euromaidan identity, would explain collective action over and above SIMCA and EMSICA. Specifically, we expected that the Euromaidan group identity would proximally predict collective action, and would emerge (i.e., be predicted) in affective reaction to injustice (anger) and perceived unfairness of the authorities, following the pathways suggested by the EMSICA model.
Method
Participants and procedure Participants were approached through a public online survey posted to Facebook pages that were generally involved in discussing political events in Ukraine. The data were collected between 25 January 2014 and 19 February 2014, at the time when the Euromaidan protests reportedly turned into an insurrection (Kudelia, 2015) . The questions of the survey focused on socio-demographics and attitudes towards current political issues. The items were available in Ukrainian. Participants were required to be of the Ukrainian nationality and aged over 18.
No target for the sample size was set, rather the aim was to assemble the largest sample possible in the time available. To that end, the lead researcher continuously advertised and recruited (without inspecting results) over that period. The biggest response rate was obtained on the second day of data collection (N = 2,372, 55.4% of the total sample). The survey was kept active online until participation slowed down to around two respondents per day. Four thousand two hundred and eighty-one volunteers entered the survey by consenting to participate in the research, 3,096 completed all survey items and were included in the final sample. The sample ranged in age from 18 to 79 (M age 31.43 years, SD = 8.51) and comprised 60.8% women. Participants were highly educated (66.6% having graduated from university), 47% were employed full time, and 67.3% indicated Ukrainian as their first language. Some 77.9% reported that they completed this survey while in Ukraine, and 22.1% -while living abroad.
Measures
After consenting to participate, participants completed socio-demographic measures and then were asked to complete the survey.
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Social identification with the Euromaidan First, we assessed the extent to which participants identified with the Euromaidan movement, using a modified Inclusion-of-the-Other in-the-Self-Scale (the IOS scale, Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992) where higher numbers were indicative of a smaller felt distance between oneself and others participating in the movement.
Social identification with Ukraine
Next, participants rated six items from Leach et al. (2008) to measure their group-level self-investment into Ukraine's national category (e.g., 'I often think about the fact that I am a part of the Ukrainian people', 'I am glad to be part of Ukraine', 'I feel solidarity with people in Ukraine'), a = .94. These and other measures below used five-point Likert scales labelled from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree).
Disidentification from the EU and CU Six items adapted from Becker and Tausch (2013) were used to assess participants' disidentification from the EU/CU. Based on the confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs), two items were excluded from the original scale. We provide the results of these analyses in the subsequent section. The remaining items used for these scales were as follows: 'I would regret that my country belongs to EU/CU', 'I wish my country had nothing to do with EU/CU', 'My country has nothing in common with most members of EU/CU', and 'My country is completely different from other members of EU/CU', EU (a = .77) and the CU (a = .89).
Group efficacy beliefs
We used six items adapted from Yeich and Levine (1994) to measure participants' beliefs about political collective efficacy. CFA showed that one item ('Dramatic change can occur in Ukraine if people banded together and demanded political change') loaded below .40, and thus, it was excluded from the scale. The remaining five items were as follows: 'If enough people in Ukraine got organized and demanded change, politicians would take steps to end the problem European integration in favour of protesters', 'Organized groups of citizens can have much impact on the political policies in Ukraine', 'Politicians would respond to our needs if we began a social movement of European integration', 'Politicians would respond to needs of citizens if enough people demanded change', and 'Politicians would listen to the protesters if we pressured them to', a = .85.
Group-based anger
Anger was measured by asking 'How the decision of the authorities to suspend the Ukraine-EU association agreement makes you feel?' A list of emotion terms was adapted from Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000) . Thus, participants were asked to indicate the degree to which they felt 'irritated', 'angry', 'furious', and 'displeased'. The four items loaded on one component (72.47%) (KMO = .819; Bartlett's test of sphericity: v 2 (10) = 6,968.409, p < .001) and were treated as a scale for measuring a group-based anger, a = .87.
Fairness of the political authorities in Ukraine
We then asked participants to indicate in general how fair or unfair they thought the functioning of the police, courts, the current parliamentary majority, and the national government is in granting/representing the constitutional rights of Ukrainians. We combined these four items to form an index assessing fairness of the political authorities in Ukraine, a = .85.
Collective action intentions
Nine items assessed the extent to which participants were willing or not willing to participate in different actions (e.g., 'to sign a petition'; 'to attend a non-violent street action'; 'to display symbolic attributes of the protest on your vehicle/clothes') against the Ukraine's government decision, a = .88.
Results

Analytic strategy
Data analysis comprised three steps. First, using SPSS version 24, we performed preliminary analyses to ensure that there were no violations of the assumptions. This step also comprised Little's missing completely at random (MCAR) test. Secondly, using MPlus software version 7.4 (Muth en & Muth en, 2007), we conducted CFA of the composite variables to ensure valid psychometric properties of the indicators of the latent constructs. Finally, we used structural equation modelling (SEM) to test whether the proposed theoretical model (M 1 ) explains collective action intentions to a greater extent than either EMSICA (M 2 ) or SIMCA (M 3 ).
3 This phase of the analysis also comprised a comparative test of the causal ordering suggested by SIMCA and EMSICA. We used the probability level associated with the R 2 value as a criterion of the evaluation.
Preliminary analysis
First, we analysed the zero-order relations between the variables (see Table 1 ). As expected, the associations between all action-related constructs and collective action intentions were significant and in the expected direction, rs ranging from À.18 to .40, ps < .001. Furthermore, consistent with previous findings regarding the mobilizing effect of disidentification (Chayinska et al., 2017a) , disidentification from the CU was significantly associated with participant's willingness to engage in protest behaviour (r = .40, p < .001).
Little's MCAR test suggested that the pattern of missing data was non-random v 2 (36) = 229.29, p < .001. Responses were particularly likely to be missing on collective efficacy beliefs (25.2%) and collective action intentions (26.9%), the items which appeared at the end of the questionnaire. The analysis of missingness indeed exhibited a systematic pattern with the number of missing cases gradually increasing by the end of the survey. Such a trend is common in large-scale surveys (e.g., Dong & Peng, 2013; Little, 1988) , and thus, we opted for excluding missing cases instead of replacing them with the imputed data, but the results should nevertheless be interpreted with caution.
Confirmatory factor analysis
Confirmatory factor analyses were conducted to test the factor structure underlying the proposed predictors. Highly correlated error terms were observed among indicators within a number of latent variables (identification with Ukraine, disidentification from CU, perceived fairness of the authorities, collective action intentions 4 ) and, thus, were allowed to correlate. The resulting improved factor models showed a good fit and were used for the subsequent analysis. The summary of CFA model statistics for each model including the information about the excluded items is provided in Table 2 .
Structural equation modelling with latent constructs
Following our hypothesis, we estimated the proposed model to evaluate the extent to which social identification with Ukraine and disidentification from CU and EU were associated with collective action intentions, both directly and indirectly through anger, group efficacy beliefs, perceived fairness of the authorities, and Euromaidan identity. The proposed model combined EMSICA pathways to collective action intentions with the more complex self-categorization processes (see Figure 1) .
As shown in Table 3 , Euromaidan identity was positively related to identification with Ukraine, and disidentification from the CU, and negatively related to disidentification from the EU. The indirect effects of these three self-categorical processes on Euromaidan identity via anger were significant, consistent with the idea that shared emotional reactions to injustice can have a binding effect for a formation of an opinion-based group identity. Interestingly, while group efficacy did not mediate any of the effects, the perception of unfair authorities mediated the effects of disidentification from both the EU and CU on Euromaidan identity in opposite directions. The few participants disidentified from the CU (reflecting their pro-Russia political orientation), the more they were likely to perceive the authorities as fair, and this, in turn, was negatively associated with the protest identity. However, the few participants disidentified from the EU (i.e., reflecting their pro-EU orientation), the less fair they were likely to perceive the political authorities. The perception of the authorities as fair and anger over the decision to suspend the EUUkraine agreement was also directly related to the Euromaidan identity, whereas the sense of collective efficacy was not.
As shown in Table 4 , collective action intentions were directly related to the Euromaidan identity, but also by identification with Ukraine and disidentification from the Note.
a The excluded items for disidentification from CU and EU were as follows: 'I feel a distance between my country and EU/CU' and 'I feel detached from the EU/CU'. Note. The push-and-pull processes of self-categorization give rise to Euromaidan identity (indirect effect) through group-based anger (R 2 = .37), group efficacy beliefs (R 2 = .13), and perceptions of authorities as fair (R 2 = .12), and predict engagement in coordinated collective action (direct effect).
CU through anger and perception of unfair authorities. These specific indirect effects were in line with our expectations. Contrary to our prediction, group efficacy beliefs were unrelated to Euromaidan identity, however, as predicted group efficacy beliefs were positively related to collective action intentions.
Comparing goodness of fit of the three models (see Table 5 ), we found that the proposed model (M 1 ) as well as the alternative models (i.e., M 2 and M 3 ) fitted the data well. 5 In terms of the explained variance, M 1 explained collective action intentions to a greater extent than the nested models with their specific ordering of the variables, respectively M 2 and M 3 . Thus, the proposed model, which accounted for direct and indirect paths of the self-categorical push-and-pull processes in the emergence of social movements, explained more variance in collective action intentions than SIMCA or EMSICA.
Discussion
Our purpose in this paper was to explore the mechanisms behind the emergence of the Euromaidan social movement by integrating the insights from social identity research on collective action. Drawing on the social identity construct of the social competition strategy, our focal point has been that the Euromaidan identity helped many Ukrainians in their efforts to realign the boundaries of the Ukrainian national identity by means of Note. Path coefficients are standardized estimates. p = .000 denotes p < .001.
coordinated collective action. Our second core point concerned direct and indirect processes involved in the formation of Euromaidan identity. Our claim was that Euromaidan was an emergent group identity, the outcome of push-and-pull selfcategorical processes and appraisals of injustice. This research adds to the ongoing discussion in the collective action literature in three ways. First, the findings of this study present evidence for the hypothesis that the Euromaidan was an opinion-based group identity. Similar to the core argument of Smith et al. (2015) , we showed that Euromaidan identity was formed to convey a shared understanding of dissenting individuals about how they wanted their country to be at the crossroads between the two competing geopolitical actors -the European Union and the Russia-led Customs Union. McGarty et al. (2009) have noted that 'opinion-based groups can also help to restructure problematic intercategory boundaries ' (p. 847) . In this respect, we found that Euromaidan identity, formed around the aspiration of Ukrainian people to see their country integrated with the EU, was shown to predict coordinated collective action against the government who favoured closer political and military ties with Russia. In particular, our key claim was that formation of Euromaidan identity evolved through push-and-pull processes of self-categorization in which the expression of group loyalties to the Ukrainian nation through self-investment acted as a pull force and disidentification from the CU acted as a push force. The negative effect of EU disidentification on Euromaidan identity is, of course, a double negative. It implies that identification with the EU was an important aspect of Euromaidan. However, the relatively small effects of disidentification from the CU (itself unrelated to being pro-EU), and its direct relation to collective action, suggest that the Euromaidan was not as anti-Russian as the intention to take action itself was. The implication of this finding is crucial for psychological research as it demonstrates how a naturally existing flexible and multifaceted self-view (i.e., composed of a pro and con positioning to an issue) can be differently translated into both identification as a member of new social movement and willingness to take collective action on its behalf. Thus, these data are among the first to show how in response to the rapidly changing political context, dissenting individuals were using their complex identity repertoire to articulate the essence of the social movement (i.e., pro-European) and define the tone to their collective action (i.e., anti-CU).
Secondly, the results of this study present some evidence for the hypothesis that the Euromaidan protests can be conceived as a social competition strategy, whereby dissenting individuals aimed to produce the foreign policy change. Consistent with our prediction, we found that protesters tended to engage in collective action to defeat and overturn the alternative pro-Russia integration project championed by the government. The relatively large positive effects of CU disidentification in predicting collective action suggest that active rejection of closer ties with Russia was the driving force behind people's intentions to take coordinated collective action. Interestingly, the direct effects of CU disidentification on collective action were greater in magnitude than its indirect effects through Euromaidan, suggesting that regardless of whether there was the collective entity (i.e., Euromaidan) involved in a social struggle, opponents of Ukraine's integration with Russia were likely to see protest as a means by which they could attain social change. Generally speaking, this finding indicates that in the context, in which people hold different, contested understanding of a shared category membership, the shared identity can be viewed as a resource worth the struggle. Not only will people be willing to interpret the meaning of such categories in the way that allows them to see themselves as prototypical group members (e.g., Hopkins et al., 2006; Livingstone & Haslam, 2008; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Wenzel et al., 2007) , but under certain condition, they will also be keen to engage in a group struggle to assert their definition of such categories.
Finally, the findings provided empirical tests of two different theoretical models, namely van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) SIMCA model and Thomas et al.'s (2009) , Thomas et al.'s (2012 Thomas et al.'s ( , 2016 EMSICA model, but with some new twists. Consistent with our prediction, we found some support for EMSICA suggesting that Euromaidan can be considered as an emergent group identity. The results revealed that its emergence was preceded by participants' anger over the government's decision to suspend the EUUkraine agreement and their general perception of untrustworthiness of the governing authorities (reflected by the negative effects of perceived fairness of the authorities). Whereas there is a considerable agreement within the literature on the mobilizing effects of group-based anger (e.g., St€ urmer & Simon, 2009; Tausch et al., 2011; Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009; van Zomeren et al., 2008) and allegations of corruption against an authority (e.g., Bou Zeineddine & Pratto, 2017; Chayinska & Minescu, 2018; Thomas & Louis, 2014) , our study sheds light on the process by which the tendency to blame the system in untrustworthiness can also become a core binding factor in the formation of protest identities. An intriguing implication of this finding is that it reveals the interplay between the push-and-pull self-categorical processes, appraisals of political conditions, and collective behaviours they afford.
Taken together, these findings contribute to a more situated understanding of the mechanisms underlying the emergence of bottom-up social movements. The take-home message from this research is that understanding the processes behind the emergence of protest identities requires a more holistic and contextualized approach that recognizes a magnitude of an ideological dissensus within a given society over the meaning of shared categories and the role of coercive governance exercised in that society, which together may pave the way to public discontent. The capacity to express such public discontent through some identifiably common and coherent opinion may then turn public discontent into a social movement, in which the emergence of protest identity is likely to constitute a tipping point in the formation of large-scale social mobilizations.
Limitations and further directions
Although we obtained a large general population sample in the midst of tumultuous historical events, it must be noted that the present research has several important limitations. One is that we used a one-shot self-selected cross-sectional correlational design while focusing on a single political context, namely Ukraine's Euromaidan movement and, therefore, additional empirical evidence stemming from either longitudinal data or experimental data is crucial for firmer causal conclusions. Caution should also be exercised in relation to the non-random pattern of missing data in this very large sample.
Second, collective efficacy was not clearly linked to the Euromaidan identity even though, as expected, it was a predictor of intentions to engage in collective action. We do not wish to read too much into this result because the efficacy measure was a general measure of collective political efficacy that has high face validity and seems relevant to the context, but had the highest missing data rate of any of the predictors. It might be tempting to conclude that Euromaidan identity was more about anger and perceived injustice than efficacy, but we suspect that is an oversimplification. To be able to draw a conclusion about a causal relationship between these constructs, experimental or longitudinal research should further investigate whether and how changing beliefs about collective efficacy can influence group formation processes.
Third, because the proposed model is based on shared variance between variables it may not be able to adequately explain the emergence of collective action in terms of the qualitative transformations and points of transition from inaction to action (see Livingstone, 2014) or in the meaning of politicized and personal identities, and the relation between the two (e.g., Turner-Zwinkels, van Zomeren, & Postmes, 2015) . Almost by definition identity emergence and formation need to be studied longitudinally, and that is hard to do in advance of the matters that bring protesters on to the streets. Protests leading to social change are often unexpected because the decisions that provoke them are unexpected (as may be the downfall of the authorities).
That brings us to a fourth and final matter that points to both a limitation and strength of this research. Perhaps the most fundamental shortcoming of this study is that it did not account for different paths to radical/illegal and moderate collective behaviour (for this analysis, see Chayinska, Minescu, & McGarty, 2017b) . We were able to recruit a very large sample of participants using a survey design at the time that the events were happening in a sociopolitical context where civil protest had been made illegal. Therefore, including the scale that measures participants' intentions to engage in radical collective action would have potentially enabled us to uncover the mechanisms behind the political extremism (e.g., Tausch et al., 2011; Thomas & Louis, 2014) . However, the fact that we were able to recruit thousands of Ukrainians to complete an online survey without reimbursement at the time when the Parliament of Ukraine passed a set of anti-protest laws that included measures limiting not only street assemblies but also Internet freedoms (Zelinska, 2017) , suggests that, for some participants, completing our survey was itself a political act. Taken together, our study suggests that it is possible to conduct large-scale social psychological research contemporaneously with protest, and thus presents an important proof of concept.
